A influêcnia do incentivo no comportamento oportunista de risco moral: uma análise experimental

AUTOR(ES)
DATA DE PUBLICAÇÃO

2009

RESUMO

Conflicts arising from differences in interests between the company and its directors have been the object of study in the organizational context. One of the problems related to these conflicts is moral hazard, which is characterized as an opportunistic behavior on the part of the manager, after the contract has been signed. In order to minimize this problem, the companys owner may use incentives, which have the important function of aligning the managers interests with his or her own, reducing the moral hazard and establishing a position of competitive advantage for the company. The objective of this paper is to analyze the influence of type of incentive (monetary, non-monetary, or mixed) on the managers moral hazard behavior. The method used was a quasi-experiment, which was applied in pairs and in three rounds, which included three different types of incentive. The results show that the type of incentive does not significantly influence the respondents answers. However, an interactive effect, arising from a lack of prior knowledge of the partner, was detected in the relationship between type of incentive and intention of moral hazard, leading to a significant increase when a monetary incentive was used

ASSUNTO(S)

risco moral incentivos administracao moral hazard incent ives agency theory teoria da agência

ACESSO AO ARTIGO

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