A questÃo da prova de colusÃo e o caso do setor siderÃrgico brasileiro uma proposta de inserÃÃo de elementos de teoria dos jogos nos fundamentos da polÃtica de defesa da concorrÃncia

AUTOR(ES)

Silvinha Pinto Vasconcelos

DATA DE PUBLICAÇÃO

2001

RESUMO

At this work, it is discussed the decision of the Brazilian Antitruste Authority (CADE) in the prosecution against metallurgy firms by collusion. Some difficulties were indicated in this decision due the existence of limitations referent to: the approach to obtain ex post collusion proofs; and a negligent procedure, that disregard ex ante mechanisms. The general objective was to analyse how the CADEâs performance, in prosecutions that purpose to verify if there is collusion, can be improved by using tools of game theory. The first step was to compare the main approaches about collusion: the Traditional Industry Economy and the New Industrial Economy. At this point, the results are: the Antitrust Authority canât make decisions based only on the causal relationship between conduct, structure and performance variables; the equilibrium choices are interdependent; the strategies should be analysed dynamically and used as collusion evidence; the Antitruste Authority should be more worried with equilibrium results than conduct and structure aspects. The second step of this work was to indicate two approaches of collusive results, and the application of a simple collusion test at the Brazilian metallurgy sector. The results show that there is a capacity excess in the common flat steel sector and the biggest group had a smallest profit by capacity unity. Therefore, there are evidence that collusive results occurred in the sector and could be avoided by the Antitruste Authority. In relation of the third objective of this work, the conclusion is that the Antitruste Authority should define schemes to prevent anticompetitive results. Then, were analysed the Leniency Programs that benefits who reveals useful evidences with sanctions decreases. The different approaches and the alternative sets of leniency rules indicate that under certain conditions, would be interesting that the Brazilian Antitruste Authority included some changes at the Leniency Program like to admit decrease of sanctions, differentiated by firms that voluntary reveals before investigation has started; to admit awards; to include employees as delators

ASSUNTO(S)

economia cartel cade siderÃrgicas brasileiras

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