Combinatorial auction design
AUTOR(ES)
Porter, David
FONTE
National Academy of Sciences
RESUMO
Combinatorial auctions allow for more expressive bidding in which participants can submit package bids with logical constraints that limit allowable outcomes. This type of auction can be useful when participants' values are complementary or when participants have production and financial constraints. However, combinatorial auctions are currently rare in practice. The main problems confronted in implementing these auctions are that they have computational uncertainty (i.e., there is no guarantee that the winning bids for such an auction can be found in a “reasonable” amount of time when the number of bidders and items becomes larger) and that the auction is cognitively complex and can lead participants to pursue perverse bidding strategies. This article describes a type of combinatorial auction that, during laboratory testing, eliminated these problems and produced extremely efficient outcomes.
ACESSO AO ARTIGO
http://www.pubmedcentral.nih.gov/articlerender.fcgi?artid=196943Documentos Relacionados
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