On the Impossibility of an Exact Imperfect Monitoring Folk Theorem

AUTOR(ES)

Azevedo, Eduardo Monteiro de

DATA DE PUBLICAÇÃO

29/06/2007

RESUMO

It is shown that, for almost every two-player game with imperfect monitoring, the conclusions of the classical folk theorem are false. So, even though these games admit a well-known approximate folk theorem, an exact folk theorem may only be obtained for a measure zero set of games. A complete characterization of the efficient equilibria of almost every such game is also given, along with an inefficiency result on the imperfect monitoring prisoner s dilemma.

Documentos Relacionados

• ON COWLING'S THEOREM ON THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF SELF-MAINTAINED AXISYMMETRIC HOMOGENEOUS DYNAMOS*
• On the impossibility of predicting the behavior of rational agents
• AN EXTENSION OF THE ALEXANDER DUALITY THEOREM
• ON THE MAXIMAL ERGODIC THEOREM
• On the classical energy equipartition theorem