Cheap Talk
Mostrando 1-4 de 4 artigos, teses e dissertações.
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1. On the limits of cheap talk for public good provision
This article studies a model where, as a consequence of private information, agents do not have incentive to invest in a desired joint project, or a public good, when they are unable to have prior discussion with their partners. As a result, the joint project is never undertaken and inefficiency is observed. Agastya, Menezes and Sengupta (2007) prove that wi
Publicado em: 18/09/2008
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2. CENTRAL BANKER TALK / COMUNICAÇÃO DO BANCO CENTRAL
This paper considers the role played by communication as a policy instrument by the Central Bank. In the model, a Central Banker who is better informed than the price setters about the state of the Economy can, through (cheap talk) communication, influence their pricing behavior. We relate the degree of communication to fundamentals of the economy such as th
Publicado em: 2008
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3. CONLUIO EM LEILÕES REPETIDOS COM COMUNICAÇÃO SEM CUSTO / COLLUSION IN REPEATED AUCTIONS WITH CHEAP TALK MESSAGES
Este trabalho apresenta um modelo de conluio em leilões repetidos de primeiro preço estático, ou seja, um esquema de conluio que usa a mesma regra de conluio em toda a fase de cooperação, independente da história do superjogo. Neste ambiente, introduzimos um mecanismo de comunicação sem custo, por meio do qual os jogadores transmitem sua ordenação
Publicado em: 2003
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4. Signaling among relatives. III. Talk is cheap
The Sir Philip Sidney game has been used by numerous authors to show how signal cost can facilitate honest signaling among relatives. Here, we demonstrate that, in this game, honest cost-free signals are possible as well, under very general conditions. Moreover, these cost-free signals are better for all participants than the previously explored alternatives
The National Academy of Sciences.